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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Was the trial court correct in ruling that there was no 
genuine issue of a material fact and plaintiff waived any 
rights he may have had to extra sales commissions and that 
defendants were therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action commenced by B. R. Woodward and Woodward 
Marketing, Inc. to recover extra commissions allegedly earned 
under the terms of a written agreement with defendants. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
Following a hearing upon defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the trial court found that plaintiff had raised no 
genuine issue as to a material fact and that, as a matter of 
law, plaintiff waived any right he may have had to additional 
compensation under a written agreement between himself and 
defendants. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On or about February 24, 1983, plaintiff B. R. 
Woodward Marketing, Inc. ("Woodward"), and defendant, Collins 
Food Service, Inc. ("Collins"), entered into a sales represen-
tative agreement (the "contract"). 
2. Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the contract, the 
parties agreed to compensate Woodward monthly according to a 
sliding scale with respect to sales recorded in a "Daily Sales 
by Salesman" report, with payments to be made on the 20th day 
of each month. 
3. Woodward and Collins also agreed in the contract as 
follows: 
In the event that a sales account becomes worthless 
after the payment to Woodward Marketing of the Incen-
tive Commission described in paragraph 4(b) [sic; 
should be 3(b)] the amount of such Incentive Commis-
sion paid will be deducted in the subsequent payment 
period. 
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4. Woodward was aware that commissions under paragraph 
3(b) were to be paid on the 20th day of each month: 
Q. (by Mr. Smith) You were aware, were you not, that the 
commissions, if there were any, were to be paid on the 
20th day of each month; correct? 
A, (by Mr. Woodward) That's right. 
Woodward Deposition, p. 49. 
5. Although Woodward claimed to have copies of a "Daily 
Sales by Salesman" report, he never requested any commissions 
based on that report: 
Q. When you knew what it [Sales by Salesman Report] 
was, did you ask for it? 
A. Yes, at that point in time. 
Q. And received it? 
A. Right. 
Q. And you had that report in front of you; correct? 
A, Yes, for a few month period. 
Q. Did you ever request commissions based on that 
report? 
A. No I didn't. 
Woodward Deposition, pp. 48-49. 
6. Woodward felt that he was entitled to a commission 
under paragraph 3(b) but did not request payment* 
Q. Well, did you feel you were entitled to a commis-
sion under paragraph 3? 
A. I felt I did. I chose not to make any comment or 
ask for anything. 
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Salt Lake was in total chaos and I had been made 
quite aware that the money I was being paid was 
more than anybody else. And I felt that asking 
for more moneyf or even, you know, even question-
ing the commission situation, might jeopardize my 
standing in the company. So I just kind of 
rolled over and played dead. 
Q. And so you're telling us that you knew that you 
were entitled to incentive commission, yet you 
never requested it at any time during the time 
you were employed? 
A. In that whole period, no. 
7. Woodward stated that the reason he didn't ask for the 
commission is that he was afraid that Collins might fire him, 
and that in view of the situation in the Salt Lake City office, 
he was "more than willing to settle for $45,000 a year" which 
he was already being paid under paragraph 3(a) of the con-
tract. Woodward Deposition, p. 62. 
8. Collins had the right, pursuant to the Agreement, to 
cancel the Agreement upon 30 days written notice to Woodward. 
(R.9) 
9. Woodward made no request, written or oral, for any 
commission under paragraph 3(b) of the contract until after he 
was terminated. 
Q. Now, when was the first time in which you thought 
that you were owed something under the incentive 
commission clause of the contract 3(b)? 
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I guess it was in March of '83— '84? 
'83 was the year you were hired. 
Yes, '83. 
The first month you went with -
No; May. It was May. Excuse me. 
Two months after - March, April, May -
Right. 
And you were aware of what your sales were, I 
take it? 
I knew what the sales different customers were 
producing, yes. 
And you felt at the time you were owed the com-
mission under 3(b) of the contract? 
Yes. Based on my understanding, I thought that 
the money was due me, yes. 
And you've earlier stated that you never made any 
request for the money, orally or in writing, 
until after you were terminated; correct? 
Other than a comment to Craig Hansen. But that 
was not even a request. It was like, "What the 
hell's going on?" you know. 
And the reason you said that you thought it might 
cause your termination if you asked about that? 
And you testified earlier that you waited until 
you had nothing to lose to make the claim; cor-
rect? 
That made sense to me. 
Kind of lying in the weeds during the time you 
were employed there? 
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A. They never made much money. Even the whole time 
I was there was - you know, 
Q. So you really didn't think that the situation 
justified paying any more salary or any more com-
mission? 
A. Well/ whether I testified or notf I didn't think 
it would be a smart move for me to ask for more 
money under the conditions. 
Woodward Deposition/ pp. 100-103. 
10. Woodward was terminated by Collins on or about 
October 22f 1984. Woodward Deposition/ Exhibit 8. 
11. Woodward first made a claim for the extra commissions 
on November 15f 1984, and filed suit on November 16/ 1984. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At Woodward's deposition he expressly admitted that he 
chose not to assert any claim for extra commissions during the 
period he was employed but ratherf in his own wordsf "just kind 
of rolled over and played dead." On the basis of undisputed 
facts/ he waived his claim for extra commissions and the trial 
Court properly so ruled. 
Woodward has not succeeded in manufacturing a genuine issue 
of a material fact by creating a conflict between his deposi-
tion testimony and a later affidavit. The clear statements in 
his deposition/ subject to cross-examination by his own coun-
sel/ should control. 
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Woodwardfs conduct forms the basis for denying the 
requested relief both under principles of implied waiver and 
estoppelf and the trial court's ruling should stand. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT 
THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT AND THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In an order signed November 5, 1985, the trial court 
granted Collins1 Motion for Summary Judgment and ruled that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact and, as a matter 
of law, Woodward had waived any right he may have had to claim 
additional compensation under the agreement between the parties. 
Summary Judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute 
as to a material fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Horgan v. Industrial Design Corporation, 
657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). 
A. Woodward's Conduct Is Not In Dispute. 
It cannot be disputed that, in the event Woodward actually 
believed he had the right to additional commissions pursuant to 
the contract, he never chose to assert that right at any time 
during his employment with Collins. 
1. Woodward admitted that he did not assert the 
right he is now claiming. 
At his deposition, when questioned about the extra commis-
sions, Woodward stated that although he felt he was entitled to 
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a commission under paragraph 3, he "chose not to make any com-
ment or ask for anything. . . . I just kind of rolled over and 
played dead." 
It is also clear that Woodward knew that any commissions 
due him under paragraph 3(b) of the contract were to be paid on 
the 20th of each month on a month-to-month basis. Had Woodward 
made a claim for what Collins viewed to be double commission, 
at the time when such commissions were to be paid, Collins 
could have made a business decision to terminate Woodward pur-
suant to the 30-day notice period of the contract. Because 
Woodward did not assert his alleged rights, Woodward now claims 
the right to double commissions over the complete period of his 
employment. His considered decision to "roll over and play 
dead" thus engendered detrimental reliance on the part of 
Collins. 
2. Woodward's attempt to manufacture an issue of 
fact should be disregarded. 
At his deposition, Brad Woodward stated that he never made 
any request for extra money, either orally or in writing, until 
after he was terminated (Statement of Facts, H 9). At Collins1 
Motion for Summary Judgment he attempted to raise an issue of 
fact by stating, in an affidavit, that he had reminded officers 
of Collins about his right to extra money. In Webster v. Sill, 
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983), this court stated: 
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As a matter of general evidence law, a deposition 
is generally a more reliable means of ascertaining the 
truth than an affidavit, since a deponent is subject 
to cross-examination and an affiant is not. That does 
not mean, however, that in summary judgment proceed-
ings, a deposition should be accorded greater weight 
than an affidavit. The purpose of summary judgment is 
not to weigh the evidence. But when a party takes a 
clear position in a deposition, that is not modified 
on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an 
issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts 
his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation 
of the discrepancy. A contrary rule would undermine 
the utility of summary judgment as a means for screen-
ing out sham issues of fact. 
Id. at 1172-73 (citations omitted). 
Such appears to be the situation here. The trial court 
properly rejected Woodward's attempt to manufacture an issue of 
fact. 
It should also be pointed out that the mere existence of 
genuine issues of fact in a case does not preclude entry of a 
summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution 
of the case. Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 
752 (Utah 1982). On all material issues in this case, there is 
no dispute as to the crucial facts relied upon by the trial 
court in granting Collins' motion for summary judgment. 
B. Woodward's Conduct Constitutes An Implied Waiver. 
The terms waiver and estoppel are often used interchange-
ably, partly because estoppel and waiver can, and often do, 
spring from the same conduct. There are differences between 
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the two doctrines, however, waiver being the voluntary, inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right, and estoppel being 
defined as action or conduct which precludes a party from 
asserting its rights where said action or conduct renders it 
inequitable to allow the party to assert those rights. Hunter 
v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983). The facts of this 
case support either theory. 
The circumstances of this case are very similar to those 
set forth in the case of Celmer v. Schmitt, 645 P.2d 946 (Mont. 
1982), wherein an employee was hired at a certain salary, plus 
other allowances, eventually quit, and following his termina-
tion, sued for overtime compensation. The court noted that one 
substantial issue would be determined on appeal, namely, 
whether the employer had failed to fully compensate the 
employee during his course of employment. The court affirmed 
the district's court denial of additional compensation to the 
employee, stating: 
In any event, an employee would be estopped from 
claiming compensation for overtime work where he 
failed to report it to or informed his employer that 
he expected compensation for and until he instituted 
suit after his discharge. 
Id. at 948. 
The court in Celmer also cited the case of Herman v. Golden 
Arrow Dairy, 71 P.2d 581 (Wash. 1937). In Herman, a discharged 
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employee sued his former employer for wages relating to over-
time work. The court held that the employee's wages were con-
trolled by the union scale which mandated pay at time and a 
half for overtime. The court noted, however, that even though 
the union was enforcing the pay scale, the employee did not 
demand overtime pay from his employer when it was to be paid 
and was estopped from later asserting it: 
Even then he did not report it [the overtime work] or 
advise the appellant [employer] that he was expecting 
compensation for it at the union scale, although he 
was receiving monthly settlements on the per diem 
union scale basis. The first notice appellant had of 
any claim of overtime was when this suit was insti-
tuted. Assuming that, under the terms of the con-
tract, he would have been entitled to overtime, he has 
by his conduct estopped himself from claiming compen-
sation for it. So furtive an attempt to pass liabil-
ity on another is not to be countenanced. 
Id. at 582-83 (citations omitted). 
Although the foregoing cases talk in terms of estoppel, 
Woodward's conduct also amounts to a waiver of any right to 
claim privileges or benefits under Paragraph 3(b) of the con-
tract. A waiver is the "voluntary and intentional relinquish-
ment of a known claim or privilege." Phoenix Ins. Co. v. 
Heath, 61 P.2d 308 (Utah 1936), 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and 
Waiver § 154. 
Waiver can also arise by conduct, in which case it is 
called an "implied waiver." The doctrine requires a detri-
mental reliance by the party who is led, by another's conduct, 
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to believe a waiver has occurred. Thus, the doctrine of 
"implied waiver" is akin to estoppel. Reiter v. Yellowstone 
County, 627 P.2d 845, 850 (Mont. 1981). The rule is summarized 
as follows: 
An implied waiver may arise where a person has pursued 
such a course of conduct as to evidence an intention 
to waive a right, or where his conduct is inconsistent 
with any other intention than to waive it. Waiver may 
be inferred from conduct or acts putting one off his 
guard and leading him to believe that a right has been 
waived. 
28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 160. See also Northern 
Arizona Gas Service, Inc. v. Petrolane Transport, Inc., 702 
P.2d 696 (Ariz. 1984), and Steiger v. Commerce Acceptance of 
Oklahoma City, Inc., 455 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1969). 
It would be an injustice to allow Woodward, during the term 
of his employment, to fail to assert the right he believed he 
had under the contract, continue his employment and after being 
terminated obtain all of the amounts he failed to request dur-
ing his term of employment. Woodward should not be allowed to 
come through the back door on a claim which he himself felt 
Collins would not have allowed if requested at the time it was 
to have been paid. Woodward's silence was the result of a 
calculated decision which was intended to, and did, result in 
detrimental reliance on the part of Collins. Such conduct 
resulted in an implied waiver of any rights he may now urge 
under his own interpretation of the contract. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Collins respectfully requests that 
Woodward's appeal be dismissed, that the judgment of the trial 
court be affirmed, and that Collins be awarded its costs herein. 
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